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This paper studies the eects of high skilled immigration on employment and net
income in the host economy where the market for low skilled labor is distorted by union
wage setting and a redistributive unemployment benet scheme. I show that high skilled
immigration can increase as well as decrease low skilled employment depending on how
the public budget adjusts to immigration and that the eects on workers' net income
levels may vary substantially. I conclude that a Pareto improvement can be achieved
if the unemployment benet level remains unaected by high skilled immigration.
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11 Introduction
The debate about an optimal immigration policy has been going on for years in almost every
developed country. Due to the rising importance of high skilled workers in an increasingly
integrated world economy, many researchers suggest that immigration guidelines should be
restructured in order to attract internationally mobile and highly qualied workers. The
economic benets that are attributed to high skilled are mainly built up on two pillars.
First, they are on average more innovative than low skilled and can therefore increase the
total factor productivity of the economy. Second, since high skilled workers on average have
higher wage incomes and are rarely unemployed they are expected to be net contributors to
the welfare state.1
However, in contrast to the intuitive arguments, only in some developed countries, a spe-
cial focus on highly qualied workers can be found in the respective immigration guidelines.
Hence, especially Anglo-Saxon countries which pursued an active skill-selective immigration
policy, display substantially higher shares of skilled immigrants than all other OECD des-
tinations (Bertoli et al., 2009). For instance, in 2006, the share of immigrants with tertiary
education of non-OECD origin varied enormously between the destination countries ranging
from 10.4 % in Italy, 12.4 % in Austria and 18.6 % in the Netherlands to 32.1 % in USA,
51.7 % in Australia and 63.6 % in Canada (OECD 2009).
But why is high skilled immigration valuated so dierently between countries? Shouldn't
one assume that high skilled immigration is benecial in all countries? By answering these
questions one muss take into account that even if high skilled immigration enhances welfare
on an aggregate level, it simultaneously has an important eect on the distribution of income,
creating "winners" and "losers".2 Furthermore, it is reasonable that the more individuals are
disadvantaged, the larger is the opposition against high skilled immigration.
This paper argues that destinations are dierently aected by high skilled immigration
since these countries exhibit dierences according to the scope and organization of their wel-
fare states. More precisely, individualistic societies as they are generally found in Anglo-Saxon
countries rather pursue a low tax policy by guaranteeing a minimum welfare state whereas
rather collectivistic societies like in Central and Southern European countries constituted a
broad welfare state with higher taxes and contributions.
Therefore, it is probable that high skilled immigration, as a positive exogenous shock
1The positive eects of high skilled immigration are well summarized by Chiswick (2007). The gain on
innovation due to high skilled immigration in the United States is measured by Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle
(2010).
2In fact, Borjas (1995) calculated that the overall eciency surplus by immigration (Berry and Soligo
1969) is very small compared to the income redistribution eect that is generated by immigration.
2to the scal budget, leads to dierent adjustment channels on the welfare state and thus
inuences the labor market outcome of the native population dierently. The model presented
in this paper concludes that high skilled immigration is more ecient in the Anglo-Saxon
welfare state so that it faces lower opposition in these countries.
In this context, I examine the employment as well as the respective net income eects that
are caused by an inow of high skilled workers. I consider a CES production technology with
high and low skilled labor as the only relevant factors of production. Both factors are assumed
to be close but imperfect substitutes as is common in empirical research on labor economics. I
further assume that the market for low skilled labor is distorted by wage setting of a monopoly
trade union as well as by an unemployment pension scheme. According to the latter, I assume
that it is funded by an egalitarian income tax rate and distinguish between dierent scenarios
of how the scal authority adjusts to an inow of foreign workers. I distinguish between an
exogenous unemployment benet case and an exogenous tax rate case. The rst case depicts a
simplistic version of the Anglo-Saxon welfare state where the government xes unemployment
pensions at a constant minimum level. The second case can be understood as an extreme
interpretation of the European welfare state where the government is interested in increasing
social security and is therefore raising the contribution rate up to a maximum value. It is
shown that the impact of high skilled immigration on employment as well as net income may
change substantially if one switches from one case to the other. More precisely, I provide proof
that in case of a constant unemployment benet level, high skilled immigration is a Pareto
improvement since both high and low skilled individuals achieve a net income gain. High
skilled immigration will generate a positive low skilled employment eect which leads to an
overall tax reduction making all considered income groups better o. Results change as one
considers the exogenous tax rate case. I show that, if the tax rate by which unemployment
benets are funded is exogenously xed, low skilled unemployment rises. With regard to net
income, low skilled individuals on average will be better o whereas high skilled workers will
denitely lose. However, the overall eect of high skilled immigration on domestic income
remains slightly positive.
The innovation of this paper is the opportunity to allow for dierent adjustment channels
of an unemployment pension scheme in a model framework with an imperfect low skilled
labor market. Thus, two strings of the recent economic literature on immigration theory
are combined. Following Fuest and Thum (2000, 2001), I conclude that immigration has a
substantial impact on unionized wage setting and thus besides wages can also inuence low
skilled employment. However, the authors do not distinguish labor according to dierent
3skill levels.3
Furthermore, since I point at the relevance of scal redistribution in the context of immi-
gration, this paper is in the tradition of Facchini and Mayda (2009). Similarly, they model
dierent scenarios how the scal authority adjusts its redistribution parameters in response
to immigration. However, unlike Facchini and Mayda (2009), who consider a redistributive
welfare state and perfect labor markets, I point at redistribution in the context of the funding
of unemployment pensions in a distorted low skilled labor market.
The paper most closely related is Kemnitz (2009) who analyses the potential of domestic
welfare losses aected by high skilled immigration. In a one sector, two factor economy
with imperfect labor markets, he proves that high skilled immigration aects low skilled
employment negatively and thus has a negative gross income eect on the domestic population
if the funding of the unemployment benet system is not too unfair. However, these results
are driven by the critical assumption that the funding rate of unemployment benets is
exogenous. In this context, the model presented in this paper is more general and allows for
dierent adjustment channels.
The forthcoming part of the paper is structured as follows: in Section 2, the basic model
framework will be introduced. Section 3 illustrates the eects of high skilled immigration on
domestic low skilled employment. In Section 4, I deduce the net income eects for high as
well as low skilled individuals. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model Framework
2.1 Production Technology
The basic model framework is similar to the one presented in Kemnitz (2009). Consider a
one good economy where the only relevant factors of production are high skilled labor H and
low skilled labor N. An aggregate good Y is produced with standard CES-technology:
Y = (N




 describes the degree of substitutability between high and low skilled workers. Let  be
the elasticity of substitution between high and low skilled labor, than  =  1
 . I follow
the empirical economic literature by assuming that  between high and low skilled labor
3In Fuest and Thum (2001), individuals can become high skilled. The high skilled leave the wok force and
become employers who earn the rms' prots.
4is larger than 1 so that 0 <  < 1.4 Low and high skilled labor is supplied by domestic
workers and immigrants. The market for high skilled labor is by assumption fully competitive
and high skilled labor supply is completely inelastic. By contrast, the low skilled labor
market is distorted by wage setting of a representative trade union. Firms choose low skilled
employment according to their prot maximization condition for a given low skilled wage. If
the wage is set above the market clearing level, the number of employed low skilled workers
N falls below the number of potential workers causing unemployment. Assume that all low
skilled individuals face the same probability of becoming unemployed, no matter whether an
individual is an immigrant or not.
To simplify, assume that the scope of immigrants can be determined by the choice of
the country's immigration policy. Thus, there is a constant and suciently large stock of
potential high and low skilled immigrants.
Let H0 account for the domestic high skilled and L0 for the domestic low skilled labor
force, mH and mL be the respective immigration levels, then (1) can be transformed to:
Y = (1 + mL)L0 (n




where n = N
L0(1+mL) describes the low skilled employment rate, h =
H0
L0 is the domestic ratio of
high to low skilled individuals and  =
1+mH
1+mL reects whether the immigration policy rather
attracts low or high skilled migrants. It is thus straightforward that  > 1 can be described
as an immigration policy which prefers high to low skilled immigrants.
Firms are assumed to face perfect competition on the product market. Factor demand is







wh = (1   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 (1   )
 1
 (4)
where wl indicates the low skilled and wh the high skilled wage rate. In this context,  is the




n+(1 )(h)). The use of  is advantageous since it also
indicates the wage elasticity of low skilled labor demand. The higher , the more elastically
low skilled labor demand reacts to changes of the low skilled wage rate.5
4For instance see Katz and Murphy 1992, Johnson 1995, Card and Lemieux 2001, Doquier et al. 2010.
5Let n;wl be the wage elasticity of low skilled labor demand, the labor share is:  = 1   1
(1 )jn;wl j.
52.2 Union Wage Setting
Suppose the low skilled wage rate to be determined by wage setting of a monopoly trade
union which is utilitarian with respect to its members. To keep it simple, I assume that
the total low skilled labor force is unionized so that the trade union takes into account the
income of employed as well as unemployed.6 The trade union is assumed to have a utility
function of the following kind:
U = (1   t)(wlN + b(L0 (1 + mL)   N)): (5)
b describes an unemployment transfer which is the unique alternative income of unskilled
workers if they become unemployed. t depicts an egalitarian tax rate by which unemployment
benets are funded. Since income of employed and unemployed is taxed by the same rate
and there are no savings, t can also be interpreted as a consumption tax.7
The trade union maximizes (5) by taking into account the rms' labor demand at a given
wage rate which is the inverse of (3). The optimal low skilled wage can be computed as a
surplus  on unemployment benets b.
w

l = (1 + )b =
1
 + (1   )
b: (6)






(1   )(1   )
 + (1   )
: (7)
(7) indicates that the wage surplus gained by wage setting  is negatively aected by an
increase of the low skilled wage share . This is reasonable as one keeps in mind that the
low skilled wage share and the wage elasticity of low skilled labor demand in absolute terms
are positively related. The higher the wage elasticity of labor demand, the larger are the
employment losses if the wage is set above the benet level. Since ceteris paribus an increase
of the high skilled work force (e.g. by high skilled immigrants) decreases the low skilled wage
elasticity of labor demand it raises the wage for low skilled workers.8
6Similarly, one could assume that a group of potential non-union workers and union members receive
the same wage and equally likely become unemployment. If we abstract from risk aversion, it also does not
matter whether the trade union is going to maximize the expected Income of its median member or the total
income of workers (Layard et al. 2005).
7At rst sight, it may seem unusual that unemployment benets are taxed. However, one can also suggest
that the unemployment benet level b(1   t) is slightly adjusted in case of a tax change.
8Let n;wl be wage elasticity of labor demand. Then, the wage set by the trade union can be calculated
6However, since there is a constant low skilled labor force which is limited to one, the
optimal low skilled wage rate set by the union has a lower end at the full employment wage
for low skilled e wl =  ( + (1   )(h)
)
1 
 . This is feasible since any further reduction in
low skilled wage would not yield any employment gains. Thus, the low skilled wage rate can
be formulized as follows:
wl = maxf(1 + )b; e wlg: (8)
(8) indicates that wage setting above the market clearing wage rate e wl only exists if the
transfer level b is suciently large (b 
f wl
1+). Since equilibrium low skilled unemployment is
a fundamental feature in all industrialized countries, I abstract from the case that unemploy-
ment transfers are too low so that the full employment wage level never exceeds the wage set
by the trade union. Otherwise labor market imperfections would not have any eect on the
labor market equilibrium.
2.3 The Public Expenditure Constraint
Firms and trade unions regard unemployment transfers as well as the tax rate as exogenous
parameters. On an aggregate level, however, both variables are linked by a balanced public
constraint. Assume that the government funds aggregate unemployment benets by raising
taxes on the entire income of the economy. This of course leads to income redistribution
since, contrary to the overall funding of the welfare system, only low skilled workers benet
from it in case they become unemployed.
b(1   t)(L   N) = t(wlN + whH) (9)
Since there is perfect competition on the product market and rms thus receive zero prots,
the gross total output is distributed among low and high skilled workers according to their









The government has two variables under control, the egalitarian tax rate and the unemploy-
ment benet level. As has been mentioned before, it is essential to know how the government
adopts these variables to changes of the employment level. I distinguish the following two
cases.
as w = jn;wl j
jn;wl j 1b.
7 an exogenous unemployment benet case (b =  b),











Figure 1: The eect of a positive shock to the public budget
Figure 1 provides a simple illustration of these cases. It is reasonable to suppose that the
exogenous tax rate case is predominantly evident in countries with comparably large welfare
states where the funding rate due to high expenditures converges to an upper limit t. The
exogenous unemployment benet case rather ts to a small welfare state where unemployment
benets only comprise a basic support mainly to guarantee the survival of the unemployed
but not to grant much further support.
It is interesting to compare how the two welfare states scenarios adjust to a positive shock
on the public budget. Figure 1 demonstrates that in the exogenous tax case, unemployment
benets rise from A to C whereas in the exogenous unemployment benet case, the funding
rate will decrease from B to D.
Of course, these are the extreme scenarios of a general adoption process and one could
also assume intermediate cases where the government adjusts both variables in response to
high skilled immigration. However, this would simply imply a mixture of the eects that are
obtained in the above cases and therefore would not provide any further insights.
83 The Eect of High Skilled Immigration on Low Skilled
Employment
This section analyzes how an immigration policy which favors high skilled workers (indicated
by  > 1) aects the low skilled employment rate. In the low skilled labor market equilibrium,
supply represented by the wage setting equation (8) equals demand indicated by the rm's
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(12) can be transformed to (13) which illustrates how domestic low skilled employment is










b;n + (1+);n   wl;n
: (13)
The right hand side of (13) can be positive or negative which depends on the way how
the government adjusts unemployment transfers to high skilled immigration. wl; and wl;n
describe the relative changes of the prot condition (3) to relative changes of high and
low skilled employment, respectively. On the contrary, (1+);, (1+);n and b;, b;n reect
how relative changes of high and low skilled employment generate relative changes of the
negotiated wage surplus  and the unemployment transfer level b. In order to achieve precise
results, I distinguish the two welfare state scenarios.
3.1 The Case of an Exogenous Benet Level
Proposition 1 Given an exogenous unemployment benet level, a relative increase of high
skilled immigration will lead to a proportional increase of low skilled employment.
Proof. A positive inuence of a relative increase of high skilled immigration on low skilled
employment is reached when both numerator and denominator of (13) are either positive or
9Note that i;j = @i
@j
j
i for i = w;(1 + );b and j = n;.









where a tilde denotes a variable in the labor market equilibrium in the case of the exogenous
benet level. From the denition of , it is known that ; =  (1   ) and ;n = (1   ).
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A relative increase of high skilled immigration leads to a proportional increase of low
skilled employment. The result is driven by the complementarity between skilled and un-
skilled labor. Thus, the factor proportion
e H
e N and the low skilled labor share e  remain
unchanged. Accordingly, the low and high skilled equilibrium wages are unaected by




@ = 0). Additionally, the tax rate which is dened as
e t =
b(1 e n)
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b(1   e n) + e Y
2 < 0: (15)
3.2 The Case of an Exogenous Tax Rate
Proposition 2 Given an exogenous egalitarian income tax rate, low skilled employment will
be negatively aected by a relative increase of high skilled workers.
Proof. A negative eect of an increase of high skilled immigration on low skilled employment
is reached when the numerator and the denominator of (13) have dierent algebraic signs.
According to (10) one can conclude that b; = wl;   ; and b;n = 1












1 n + (1+);n   ;n
: (16)
where a circumex denotes a variable in the labor market equilibrium in the exogenous tax
rate case. Due to the denitions for the wage surplus  and the low skilled wage share , one




= (1   )
2+2(1 )
(1 )+ which is between 0 and
1. This guarantees that the numerator of (16) is positive and the denominator is negative.
10Hence, the overall eect of a relative increase of high skilled immigration on low skilled
employment is strictly negative.
By combing (10) and (11) one also nds that b n = (1 t)b (+(1 )b )
(1 t)b (+(1 )b )+t. Thus, as long as
t > 0, b n < 1.









where A = (1 t)(+(1 )b )b +t
t
+(1 )b 
(1 b )(2+2(1 )b ). There exist two opposing eects: On the one
hand, an increase of the number of high skilled workers increases low skilled employment
for every given low skilled wage rate. However, this eect is dominated by increased un-
employment benets and a higher negotiated wage mark-up so that the total eect on low
skilled employment is denitely negative. In order to study the eect on equilibrium wages,















From (3) and (4) one can deduce that
@wl
@ < 0 and
@wh
@ > 0. Together with (18) one can
therefore conclude that
@c wl
@ > 0 and
@ c wh
@ < 0. The tax rate is assumed to be exogenous
(b t = t), however it can be examined how the unemployment transfer level is inuenced






















< 0. Together with (18) it follows that @b b
@ > 0.
High skilled immigration increases the unemployment benet level because the additional
income that is earned by migrants enlarges the tax base. Since in this case the tax rate is
constant, an increase of tax revenues must result in an increase of expenditures. By contrast,
since in equilibrium, unskilled unemployment rises, the expenditures for unemployed must
also be divided among more individuals. One can conclude that the second eect is minor
to the rst eect as the total impact of immigration on unemployment benets is positive.
4 Eects on Net Income
This section examines the eect of high skilled immigration on net income of the domestic
work force. This analysis is important since changes according to net income may to a large
degree inuence a society's attitude towards immigration. Economic mainstream literature
11with fully competitive labor markets and the absence of unemployment states that high
skilled immigration typically increases low skilled wages whereas wages of domestic high
skilled workers decrease.
However, results are ambiguous if one abstracts from perfect labor markets and allows for
equilibrium unemployment. Both, domestic high and low skilled are aected due to changes
on the labor market equilibrium on the one hand and the scal eects according to changes
of the redistributive unemployment benet scheme on the other.
In the model, high skilled income is limited to earnings on the high skilled labor market
reduced by income taxation.
Ih = (1   t)wh (19)
Average low skilled net income contains taxed low skilled wage income as well as unemploy-
ment benets.
Il = (1   t)(wln + b(1   n)) (20)



























By analyzing how high skilled immigration aects net income of high and low skilled workers,
I will again distinguish between the exogenous unemployment benet case and the exogenous
tax rate case.
4.1 The Case of an Exogenous Benet Level
As has been shown in the previous section, in the exogenous unemployment benet case,
wages remain unchanged in response to an increase of high skilled workers. Therefore, (21)
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12It is straightforward that a high skilled worker's net income increases since he does not bear
any wage loss but benets from a reduction of the tax rate. Low skilled also gain from the
tax reduction. However, a low skilled worker also directly benets from the employment
increase. since e wl > b.
Due to the results indicated by (23) and (24) one can conclude that in this case, high
skilled immigration leads to a Pareto improvement since it makes both, high as well as all
low skilled better o.
4.2 The Case of an Exogenous Tax Rate
The net income eects that are generated by high skilled immigration in the case of a constant
egalitarian income tax rate are more uneven.
High skilled workers will be worse o due to high skilled immigration since the impact of
high skilled immigrants on the factor proportion is additionally enlarged by the negative low
skilled employment eect that even further deteriorates the high skilled wage. Apart from
that, high skilled workers do not gain from the scal contribution of immigrants since the
tax rate is now constant so that the scal revenues will be used for enlarged unemployment









By contrast, low skilled workers will benet due to higher wages and higher unemployment
transfers. However, there is also a negative eect because of the employment loss that is
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It can be shown that the positive eects are dominant to the negative eects so that the
aggregate net income of low skilled IL is positively aected by high skilled immigration.

















Thus, in the exogenous tax rate case, domestic high skilled lose whereas low skilled benet
from immigration. Since the eects are not symmetric between high and low skilled work-
13ers, one needs to weight the income gains and losses of both skill groups by the respective
population size to calculate how total domestic income is aected by high skilled immigration.
b I = b Ih  H0 + b Il  L0 (28)
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Proposition 3 Originating from equal immigration rates for high and low skilled ( = 1),
an increase of the high skilled immigration rate relative to the low skilled immigration rate
increases total domestic income in the constant tax rate case.
Proof. Taking the rst derivative of b I with respect to  describes the overall eect of a



























Originating from equal immigration rates means that an increase of  leads to a scenario
where mH > mL so that the rst term in brackets on the right hand side of (30) is denitely
positive. Thus, db I
d > 0 if the following condition is fullled:
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A 1 it follows that (31) is fullled if
t(1   b )A > b  + t(1   b ): (32)
By inserting A = (1 t)(+(1 )b )b +t
t
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)(2+2(1 )b ) into (32) one can show that (31) is ful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14Hence, based on the assumptions of the model, an increase of high skilled immigration
relative to low skilled immigration remains benecial on the aggregate income level even if
the contribution rate is constant and the unemployment benet level is adjusted in the case
of high skilled immigration. This leads to the conclusion that high skilled immigration can
rather be harmful with regard to low skilled employment without leading to a reduction of
overall income. On an aggregate level, the model predicts that the gains that are attributed
to high skilled immigrants still dominate its costs.
5 Conclusions
By use of a simple theoretical model framework with imperfect low skilled labor markets
this paper has analyzed how low skilled employment is aected by high skilled immigration
in two dierent welfare state scenarios. The main nding is that high skilled immigration
is extremely eective in diminishing unemployment of low skilled if the scal authorities of
the respective country adjusts the tax rate to a xed unemployment benet level. In case of
a constant tax rate, low skilled labor market distortions are even intensied by high skilled
immigration leading to a reduction of low skilled employment.
A similar distinction must be made as one moves from employment to net income eects.
In the rst scenario of an exogenous unemployed benet level, a general net income gain exists,
whereas in the second scenario of a constant egalitarian tax rate, high skilled immigration
aects the two skill groups, dierently. In the latter case, I nd that high skilled workers
denitely lose whereas low skilled workers on average gain. Dierent from Kemnitz (2009), the
eect of high skilled immigration on aggregate domestic income remains positive. However,
I concude that in case of higher unemployment among low skilled and decreasing income
of high skilled workers, opposition against immigrants is much larger than in the case of a
constant unemployment benet level where all income groups are positively aected by high
skilled immigration.
The argument that distortions on the labor markets and equilibrium unemployment
should not be neglected when studying the eects of immigration and particular high skilled
immigration on the host economy attains additional support by the recent empirical liter-
ature. Ortega and Peri (2009) and Bertoli et. al. (2009) nd that, according to a cross
country estimation covering 14 OECD countries for the 1980 to 2005 period, employment is
positively aected by immigration whereas no signicant eect on wages can be identied.
With regard to immigration policy, the results make one propose that countries with
larger scal discipline that do not expand the unemployment benet level in response to the
15enlarged tax base will construct guidelines that explicitly select workers with higher education
since all incoem groups benet from it. In contrast, those economies where a broadening of
the welfare system is more realistic are probably more skeptical and try to avoid high skilled
immigration. At least to some degree, this could explain the mentioned traditional and
still existing dierences between the Central European and Anglo-Saxon attitudes towards
high skilled immigration. Additionally, the results can be regarded as a proposal for scal
authorities how to react in response to an inow of high skilled workers since only in case of
a constant benet level, a Pareto improvement is achieved.
Of course, the mentioned eects only to a small degree cover the important issues in
the debate about an optimal immigration policy. A major extension could be made by the
introduction of physical capital into the basic model framework because capital adjustments
in response to immigration is empirically relevant (see e.g. Ortega and Peri (2009)) and
capitalists as well as rms do play an inuential role in the political process limiting and
expanding the scope of high skilled immigrants.10 The innovative strength of high skilled
and intergenerational as well as international network eects have also not been analyzed in
this paper but are denitely important in this context. The goal of this paper was to highlight
the importance of imperfect labor markets, the interactions of dierent types of labor with
heterogeneous skills as well as a redistributive unemployment pension scheme in the context
of high skilled immigration and immigration policy. I hope that the framework presented in
this paper can be helpful for future research on this topic trying to explain the individual
attitudes that inuence the dierent immigration policies of the developed countries.
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A Appendix
A.1 The Eect of High Skilled Immigration on Low Skilled Income
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A.2 The Eect of High Skilled Immigration on Domestic Income
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